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1 Introduction to internet governance 
Internet governance is a hotly debated and relevant issue referring to the global control 
and management of key internet resources (Collins, 2006; Mueller, 1999). These 
resources include the internet root server system or domain name servers but also the 
allocation of IP addresses and domain names. Today the technical operation of the 
internet is relevant for the global economy and the internet provides a globally adopted 
communication medium, as well as provides a metaphor for an understanding of its 
operations. Thus political and technological aspects are thoroughly interwoven and 
cannot be separated (Castells, 1996; Kleinwaechter, 2004).  
To describe a network simply as a set of interconnected nodes is deceptive. Nodes 
with a large number of links or connections account for uneven distribution within a 
given system. For instance, the World Wide Web is dominated by highly connected 
nodes or hubs and thus can be seen to not be the egalitarian space that many imagine  
it to be (Barabási, 2002). Hubs express power not centrally but in a distributed manner  
in keeping with contemporary descriptions of democracy. The distance between nodes 
depends on whether they are part of the same network or interconnected networks.  
Thus they may be dynamic, open-ended, multiple and without limits, yet at the same  
time demonstrate representational processes of inclusion and exclusion. The switches 
connecting networks together, or more accurately routers that connect different IP 
networks, is where power is demonstrated – where power is switched on or off.  
The networks that combine communications technologies and social structures are 
fundamental to the form of late capitalism that is commonly referred to as ‘globalisation’ 
(Castells, 1996). Over the last 50 years numerous cultural commentators have 
investigated the processes that facilitate globalisation (e.g., international collaboration in 
the areas of commerce or communication infrastructures) and the related political 
processes that express new forms of sovereignty (Keohane and Nye, 1998; Hardt and 
Negri, 2000). A number of key contributing factors such as economic and military power, 
agenda setting or global policy networks have been identified (Keohane and Nye, 1998; 
Slaughter, 2001). The dynamic development of the internet provides the infrastructure 
through which new services become possible and also acts as a metaphor through which 
they can become better understood. In particular, it is clear that control and governance 
are enacted in new ways that reflect the topography of distributed network systems. This 
can be characterised as ‘governance without government’ to describe the inherently 
paradoxical ways that power is now expressed (Hardt and Negri, 2000, pp.13–14). 
This study identifies and outlines the most relevant internet deployment and 
governance implications and analyses the developments affecting internet governance. In 
terms of methodology the study follows a transdisciplinary approach that is in keeping 
with the socio-technical issues it describes. It considers different forms of governance 
given the dynamic structure of the internet as a network of networks. These can broadly 
be split into those that follow traditional organisational forms (that are broadly vertical in 
structure) and those that are collaborative and distributed in character (more horizontal in 
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character). It can be argued that the main internet governance body lacks transparency 
and clear formalised procedures. The study outlines current trends and developments with 
respect to internet governance and places these into the broader political context of 
governmentality. The tendency to regard the internet as a single, coherent unit that can  
be understood in isolation does not reflect its infrastructure and the vested interests it 
serves. These comments should also be considered against the backdrop of a perceived 
increasing corporatisation of the internet - the relative closure of the promised openness 
of the internet and the decline of its libertarian potentialities under free market principles 
(Lovink, 2002, p.2). Yet, file exchange within peer to peer networks and the free and 
open source software movement demonstrate how the network itself is adaptive and 
somewhat resistant to the controls exerted upon it. Applied to the development of 
software in general, the collaborative gathering and analysis of information is referred to 
by Stalder and Hirsh (2002) as ‘open source intelligence’. They point to the open source 
principles of peer review, the free sharing of products, and flexible levels of involvement 
and responsibility that are all derived from practice and the technical possibilities of 
‘network culture’. Free and easy information-sharing among peers, is exemplified in 
‘peer 2 peer’ networks. By network culture, we mean to refer to the cultures and 
communities surrounding the internet and the values ascribed to these activities. Such 
examples demonstrate how technical expertise and socialised labour combine to offer 
both positive and negative potential, both releasing and limiting possibilities for future 
transformation (Terranova, 2004). The argument is that despite the severe limits on 
democratic structures, there remain opportunities to rethink politics within network 
cultures – and this is what is referred to in the article as ‘non-representational democracy’ 
to describe democracy decoupled from governmental power. 
2 Internet deployment implications 
The growth of the internet has been rapid, especially since 1988 when it began to roughly 
double every year. The internet provides a network of networks as illustrated in Figure 1. 
It has grown from a small research network connecting a rather limited number of nodes 
in the late 1960s to a network connecting a growing number of networks and systems 
together. The history of this is well documented from its origins as a research project for 
the US military involving three packet switched networks (ARPANET, Packet Radio Net 
and Packet Satellite Net) that were all developed under leadership funding of the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). It subsequently absorbed Local Area 
Networks into its architecture; Ethernet, which was designed in 1973 by Bob Metcalfe at 
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) is now the dominant wired LAN technology. 
The protocol development of the internet started with the TCP/IP set of protocols 
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). TCP/IP protocols are layered one on 
top of the other and provide a wide range of capabilities (Fourazan, 2003). The most 
significant additions since the initial specification of TCP and IP include the Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP), the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols and the application 
layer protocols (e.g., e-mail protocols such as POP3, IMAP and SMTP or World Wide 
Web protocols such as HTTP). Furthermore Voice over IP is being developed (e.g., 
Session Initiation Protocol) and more widely deployed. 
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Figure 1 Internet – network of networks (see online version for colours) 
Issues of control and implementation of the above protocols goes some way to dispute 
any conception that the Internet is somehow inherently anarchic. On the contrary, control 
is expressed differently: no longer centralised or decentralised, but expressed in terms of 
distributed networks. The concept of the protocol as a set of recommendations and rules 
that outline specific technical standards is a neat analogy to describe the exercise of 
control within such systems and what stands for correct or proper behaviour (Galloway, 
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2004). Protocols thus operate as a distributed management system coding packets of 
information, documents and communication. Computers in a network agree technical 
standards of action such that the protocols ‘govern’ usage at the level of code: ‘protocol 
is a technique for achieving voluntary regulation within a contingent environment’ as 
Galloway (2004, p.7) puts it. Voluntary regulation is a particularly successful mode of 
social control. This is not to say that control is necessarily bad of course and certainly 
protocols have no vested interest in themselves. The problem lies in the fact that 
standards are set and applied according to certain ruling interests – making it a political 
issue. The network is largely non-hierarchical in structure conforming to the way TCP/IP 
connects one machine to others, but is also subject to DNS information stored in 
decentralised databases but organised in hierarchical, inverted tree-structures (Galloway, 
2004). At the top of the tree are a relatively small number of ‘root’ servers – mostly in the 
USA, Europe and Japan – that exert control over the lower branches. The technical detail 
reveals the operations of ‘control societies’ fraught with political contradictions rather 
like the ‘free market’ itself. 
The content development of the internet has become a heterogeneous assembly of 
profit and non-profit, informational and political participants. The different political 
groups and movements represent both mainstream and oppositional as well as 
democratic, radical and reactionary ideas on a global and local level. However, after the 
excessive dot-com visions and growth of the late 1990s imploded (e.g., with respect to 
share prices of internet related companies), the conduct of the so-called ‘war on terror’ 
and global recession in the period since then, much of the visions and hype surrounding 
the internet have been reconsidered (although the current hype around Web 2.0 promises 
to counter this tendency once more). It can be argued that while the years leading to  
the dot-com crash were characterised by the commercialisation of the net, since then  
the years have been characterised by a widespread politicisation of the internet (Kahn and 
Kellner, 2005). On the one hand, oppositional, non-profit groups such as the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) aim to protect the digital rights of internet users. On the other 
hand, governments plan to develop extensive information systems that will have 
implications with respect to information security (examples include projects such as the 
US governments Total Awareness Information project announced in 2002 that would 
potentially collect and collate information of individuals from a number of sources  
or the UK government’s NHS database and online plans). These projects and the 
potential development of the internet and Information Technology generate heated and 
confrontational debates that pose a number of relevant questions. Hence globalisation  
in general and the development of the internet in particular are challenging critical 
theories and are having an impact on both democratic, radical as well as reactionary  
politics. The main issues and arguments of the current global political debate and 
economic globalisation are recognisable in the policy considerations and practices of 
governance and deployment of the internet (Christou, 2006).  
The deployment and growth of internet services and online participation (Gibson, 
2005) is facilitating the development from legacy network infrastructures towards  
new network infrastructures as summarised in Table 1. From a technical or network 
architectural point of view it performs the shift from circuit switching to packet switching 
network infrastructures. This shift is having a significant impact on issues such as 
governance (e.g., market or political versus self-regulatory) and market dominance (e.g., 
the provision of domain names are a crucial control point – potential dangers of abuse 
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include exclusion or profiteering) (Collins, 2006). Both legacy and new network 
infrastructures require regulation if they are to serve the public’s interest (e.g., enable 
competitive access to the local loop for the provision of broadband services or fair 
allocation of IP addresses). 
Table 1 Legacy network infrastructure versus new network infrastructure 
Network category Legacy network infrastructure New network infrastructure 
Architecture Circuit switching Packet switching 
Routing Closed call routing ISP, dynamic routing 
Access Wired access to exchange  
(i.e., wired local loop) and 
backbone network 
Unbundled local loop and 
decentralised backbone routing 
Addressing Numbering assigned by operator Numbering assigned by ISP/internet 
registry 
Standardisation National and international 
regulations and standardisation 
organisations (e.g., ITU); 
established procedures 
Centralised control and operation; not 
formally embedded into established 
procedures (e.g., ITU versus ICANN) 
Services and content Limited services (e.g., directory 
enquiries, lottery announcements, 
etc.) and interactivity 
Interactive and multimedia services 
provided by internet service and 
WWW content providers 
A number of architectural and technical aspects are fundamental for the operation of the 
internet and the provisioning of internet services. The existence and possibility of an  
open market, transparency and competition heavily depends on internet governance (see 
Table 2). A prime example for the requirement of centralised and tightly-controlled 
internet governance (as opposed to market driven governance) lies in the areas of 
addressing and naming. As is the case for the legacy telephone network, it is required to 
have an ultimate authority with respect to address (and domain name) distribution to 
avoid (or resolve) potential addressing and naming disputes and ambiguities. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that competition may ultimately benefit customers in areas such as 
network access (e.g., with respect to performance and prices). 
However government intervention may be required to facilitate the provisioning of 
affordable internet services and to nourish competition. For example, in the UK, Oftel 
(the UK’s regulator for the telecommunications industry) has intervened on a number  
of occasions to create conditions for a competitive and user-centred market (Collins, 
2006). Examples of interventions include Oftel’s directives forcing British Telecom (BT) 
to introduce Flat Rate Internet Access Call Origination (FRIAC), to implement local loop 
unbundling or the release and pricing of wholesale datastream products. On a European 
level, the telecommunication industry has been transformed from predominantly 
uncompetitive state monopolies governed by a detailed (and rather restrictive) framework 
of regulations into a competitive market (Christou, 2006). The European Commission  
is largely responsible for the related legislation and the recent promotion of a liberal, 
multi-layer approach to the governance of the telecommunication market and industry 
(Christou, 2006; Sandholtz, 1998). These examples suggest that regulatory intervention  
is required to address the market position (and its impact upon competition) of major 
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telecommunication players. This is making fair, efficient and transparent network and 
internet governance a prerequisite for the operation and development of the internet. 
However, what is missing from these approaches is a fundamental rethink of the nature of 
governance itself that is still based on the dualism of state or market organisational logic. 
Part of the issue here is that networks evidently display inherent difficulties for the very 
nature of government. 
Table 2 Architectural and technical aspects 
Category Current state of the art 
Addressing ICANN (monopoly) 
Naming Domain names and domain name servicers ultimately 
controlled by ICANN (monopoly) 
Network access ISPs (competition) 
Limited competition between wired and wireless network 
operators; some dominant suppliers for local access (e.g., 
broadband); competition further facilitated by regulation 
Limited, but growing number of wireless providers 
Network Access Points (NAPs) and 
Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) 
Different providers, however often dominated by a single 
competitor (e.g., London Internet Exchange in the UK) 
Content Competition, but strong presence of dominant players (e.g., 
Google for search engines) 
3 Network and internet governance implications 
Several assumptions prevail with respect to internet governance: that internet governance 
is distinct from governance of other media (e.g., television), that it is extending 
effectively through the whole internet community and that it is market driven. However a 
number a key players and driving forces behind the evolution of the internet put those 
assumptions in a different light and impact upon its current and future development. 
From a European perspective, the European Union Framework Directive excludes key 
elements such as internet addressing and naming from national bodies’ responsibilities. 
This is opposed to other forms of international communications that are regulated  
by international and intra-governmental treaties (European Parliament and the  
Council of the European Union, 2002). Governance of the internet is divided between 
different institutions. The activities and authority of these are highly contested and 
remain uncertain. 
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Figure 2 Authorities in the internet 
ICANN
From November 1998
GNSO AddressesProtocols
IETF,
IRTF, 
ITU, 
WWWC,
ETSI
gnso.icann.org
IANA
Until October 1998
Internet Architecture Board
Internet Society (ISOC)
APNIC
LACNIC
ARIN
RIPE NCC
AfriNIC
 
The Internet Society (ISOC) is an international, non-profit organisation formed in 1992 to 
provide support for the internet standards and development process. ISOC accomplishes 
this through maintaining and supporting other internet administrative bodies such as 
Internet Architecture Board (IAB) or the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). ISOC 
also promotes research and other scholarly activities relating to the Internet. The IAB is 
the technical advisor to the ISOC. The main purposes of the IAB are to oversee the 
continuing development of the TCP/IP Protocol Suite and to serve in a technical advisory 
capacity to research members of the internet community. IAB accomplishes this through 
its primary components, the Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Research 
Task Force (IRTF). Another responsibility is the editorial management of the IETF’s 
Request for Comments (RFCs). IAB also facilitates external liaison between internet  
and other standards organisations and forums. The vast majority of internet related 
technological standards are developed and specified by the Internet Society (ISOC) and 
the units operating under ISOC: Internet Architecture Board (IAB), Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF), the Internet Research 
Steering Group (IRSG), Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), and the Request for 
Comments (RFCs) Editor. Whilst these organisations are responsible to ISOC, ISOC 
aims to ensure a large degree of independence in their technical work. IETF is a relevant 
and exemplary loosely self-organised, grass-roots technical group consisting of mainly of 
researchers, vendors and networking industry. It acts as an activity of ISOC and has no 
formal management (e.g., board of directors). There is no formal membership and 
generally, attendance at IETF meetings and subscription to IETF mailing lists is open  
to all volunteers. Participants are expected to contribute as individuals, rather than as 
representatives of companies or organisations. The IETF concerns itself with the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Internet governance: towards a non-representational democracy 9    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
engineering and architecture of the internet. It is the principal body that develops, tests 
and implements new internet technological standards, including protocols, that are 
published in the form of RFCs. The IETF relies on ‘volunteers’ (often representing the 
interests of an industry stakeholder) and uses ‘rough consensus and running code’ that 
results in a potentially slow process. Furthermore the number of contributors may either 
be too small to make progress or too large (i.e., making consensus difficult to reach). For 
protocols like Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) which is used to transport e-mail 
over the internet, there is also considerable resistance to any change which is not fully 
backwards compatible. Given the number of contributors with opinions on standards 
issues is very large, consensus mechanisms on how to improve the standardisation 
process prove difficult to realise in practice. 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the  
non-profit corporation that was formed to assume responsibility for the IP address space 
allocation, protocol parameter assignment, domain name system management and root 
server system management functions (in conjunction with Generic Name Supporting 
Organisation, GNSO). This was formerly performed under a US Government contract by 
IANA and other entities. The IP Addresses are allocated by means of a central authority 
that franchises them to interested organisations. For Europe, ICANN has delegated 
authority to the Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE) Network Operations Centre (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3 IP address distribution 
Global Authority
RIR
LIR RIPE Members: Local IRs, ISPs
End Users Anybody with a network/host
ICANN is a private organisation under Californian law set up by the US government 
during Bill Clinton’s presidency in 1998 (in fact, the US government continued to  
act as an overseeing body). To reassure its critics the Department of Commerce  
(DoC) announced: 
“We are looking for a globally and functionally representative organization, 
operating on the basis of sound and transparent processes that protect against 
capture by self-interested factions and that provides robust, professional 
management. The new entity’s process needs to be fair, open and  
pro-competitive. And the new entity needs to have a mechanism for evolving  
to reflect the changes in the constituency of internet stakeholders.” (Burr, 1998) 
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Since then, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration  
(NTIA), an agency of the USDoC acting as the president’s principal adviser on 
telecommunications policies, has reiterated the aim of the US government to retain  
the ‘historic role’ and to continue ‘being the steward’ in conjunction with the DoC of  
the critical elements of the internet’s underlying infrastructure, the domain name and  
the addressing system (Gallagher, 2005). 
However, the independence and neutrality of ICANN remains in question (Mueller, 
1999). Although the ICANN’s board of directors is composed of members from different 
regions of the world to represent the heterogeneity of the internet community, the close 
relationship between ICANN and the US government remains. The US government have 
been heavily criticised for using its unique ICANN relationship to ICANN to its 
advantage. In one example, the administration of US President George Bush objected to 
the .xxx adult domain that eventually led ICANN to reverse an earlier decision and reject 
the domain suffix (Koppel, 2005). However, supporters of the controversial .xxx domain 
have been able to negotiate a new proposal with ICANN. Even though final approval  
of the contract is opposed by an interesting group of anti-pornography conservatives  
and pornographers with investments in existing adult domain names, there are chances 
that the proposal will eventually succeed in gaining the approval of the ICANN board 
(Mueller and Mathiason, 2007). 
In September 2006 the US government extended an existing agreement between  
the Department of Commerce and ICANN for three years (although it could grant 
ICANN total autonomy after 18 months) (Kirk, 2006). In October 2006 ICANN  
further announced plans to develop new management operating principles, to improve 
upon the documentation of its board meetings and to redesign its website to improve the 
accessibility of its 12 000 pages. All these measures aim to improve upon ICANN’s 
transparency and to counter criticism. Other issues that must be addressed by  
internet governance include the proliferation of ‘spam’. The importance of multilateral 
discussions and legislation has been widely recognised in the context of governments 
(e.g., the European Union) and telecommunications regulators. However, the fact  
remains that some analysts and researchers value ICANN as an independent body 
representing the interests of the internet community as a whole whilst others refer  
to it as a ‘public-private partnership’ (Collins, 2006; Froomkin, 2003; Christou, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the ‘special relationship’ of ICANN to the US government appears  
as a neat parallel to the way that the globalised economy increasingly relies on 
communications technology. It also serves to emphasise that governance is increasing 
influenced by the logic of markets and technology. Governments are thereby required to 
intervene, for better or worse.  
4 Current developments and future outlook 
“The role of government is not to create wealth; the role of our government  
is to create an environment in which the entrepreneur can flourish, in  
which minds can expand, in which technologies can reach new frontiers.” 
(Gallagher, 2005) 
The above quote forms the basis of George W. Bush’s technology agenda and was 
proclaimed in November 2002. It appears to confirm that state control is increasingly 
exercised in partnership with other corporate interests outside of democratic structures. It 
Koppel or Koppell? 
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also indicates how capital occupies a ‘space of flows’ (Castells, 1996) in contrast to the 
‘space of places’ of historically created institutions and organisations of industrial society 
and the distinct role of government. Like the internet, the global economy is now 
characterised by the combination of ‘an enduring architecture and a variable geometry’ 
(Castells, 1996). What is required is both an understanding of the dynamic between the 
network model of organisation followed by corporations and the still powerful influence 
of the role of governments in influencing policy. It appears that effective governance 
must ultimately shift across and between these horizontal and vertical axis of influence. 
The example of ICANN fits this description and reveals some of its contradictions. 
ICANN decides on new top-level domain names and delegates the implementation  
and management of existing and new domains in conjunction with the Governmental 
Advisory Committee (GAC). ICANN is intent on keeping the existing model and aims to 
evolve rather than being replaced by a new model of communal state-led internet 
governance. On the other hand, the modelling and implementation of new structures for 
internet governance is the clear intention of a large proportion of the international 
community (Wray, 2005). The position regarded as a control-oriented approach proposed 
and supported by a number of states (e.g., China, Pakistan) aims to create a new 
governing council based in the United Nations (UN) that would oversee ICANN and to 
which it would be accountable. Another approach envisages a ‘lightweight’ governance 
structure (initially recommended by the EU) based on a cooperation model encompassing 
governments, industry and other relevant organisations dealing and overseeing ICANN, 
and a forum to provide a recommendations and proposals for internet practice and 
operation. At the same time, a discussion surrounding the possible control (i.e., 
censorship) surrounds this, with some players seemingly more concerned with the control 
of content than others (e.g., the official EU position is that the cooperation model is not 
about content and it advocates free speech on the internet). 
In January 2002 the United Nations General Assembly issued a proposal on 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) issues leading towards the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) series of United Nations sponsored 
conferences (Kleinwaechter, 2004). The task of organising and running the WSIS leading 
to the global summit of Tunis in November 2005 was delegated to the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). The ITU can be seen as a potential key player in 
counterbalancing the hegemonic power of the US government and ICANN. However the 
internet community seems unconvinced of ITU’s ability to play a constructive role in the 
development and governance of the internet, given the failure of ‘global’ standards such 
as the OSI model and its perceived history of bureaucracy and sluggishness. At Tunis, 
discussions over internet governance and the role of ICANN dominated the conference, 
leading to the ‘decision’ to leave overall control with ICANN. Additionally it was 
decided to establish the purely consultative Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Supporters 
of the outcome argue that the concern over US dominance over the internet (e.g., with 
respect to freedom of information) are insubstantial and that the USA will guarantee the 
best possible development of the internet. However the given status quo remains 
controversial to say the least and contested given its strategic economic, cultural and 
technological importance (Christou, 2006; Collins, 2006). It can be argued that further 
refinement of internet governance must be linked to wider regulatory changes of a 
predominantly globalised economy and international governance. 
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A number of critics of the United Nations-led IGF are concerned by the lack of  
any decision-making abilities with respect to the core aspects and ideological issues 
surrounding internet governance. A recent IGF meeting in Athens was overshadowed  
by discussions of the role of ICANN and the clash of opinions. Whilst the European 
Union endorsed an announcement by the US Department of Commerce to consider 
ending its control of ICANN, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)  
regarded the same issue as making ‘little or no change’ (Blau, 2006). The lack of any real 
decision-making abilities makes it difficult to evaluate the results or recommendations 
from the IGF at this stage. 
It has been demonstrated that state as well as market forces influence the governance 
of network access and content. Additionally network forms of governance are having a 
major impact upon the control and operation of the internet. It becomes clear that the 
internet is subject to diversification with respect to governance and not surprisingly more 
prominent network governance than other communication channels (e.g., based on legacy 
network infrastructures). This suggests that network governance and self regulation have 
the potential to contribute towards efficient and constructive governance. However, this 
discredits the notions of ‘market knows best’ and that the internet is distinct from issues 
surrounding legacy media. It can further be stressed that given the variety and complexity 
of state-industry relation that self regulation ‘is almost a misnomer… [which] rarely 
exists without some relationship between industry and the state’ (Price and Verhulst, 
2005). Cases such as the .eu Top Level Domain (TLD) provide evidence of international 
private-public governance in the internet community and this reflects the development 
towards post-regulatory state governance (Christou, 2006).  
Institutional cooperation has been instrumental to the development of the internet. 
The IETF and ICANN provide a revealing contrast of different organisational and 
internet governance cultures. It can be argued that ICANN has partly ‘failed’ because  
it represents a move away from traditional internet self-governance and that it is 
ideologically compromised given its close links to the government of a nation state (i.e., 
the USA). It can also be argued that ICANN’s effectiveness has been impeded by a lack 
of autonomy and by its dependence upon the US government to legitimate its rule. The 
resulting lack of an established culture has undermined the achievement of an effective 
and successful modus operandi (Bowrey, 2005). It can further be argued that the main 
internet governance body ICANN lacks transparency and clear formalised procedures. To 
counter this it is required to formulate clear guidelines or laws that formulate the scope of 
government interests and ICANN’s role. In contrast, the IETF has always had a clear 
mission statement and ‘voluntary’ participation which has enabled it to evolve and renew 
itself. Given the predominantly technical nature of its tasks, it facilitates an relatively 
open, fair and transparent modus operandi.  
The internet is best understood as a network of networks with a multitude of loosely 
interconnected and layered entities as opposed to one closed medium or infrastructure. It 
should not (and as this research suggests cannot) have a single, unified governance 
organisation. It is a dynamic and evolving organism with constantly changing operational 
and governance requirements. Thus the necessity of different forms of governance must 
be acknowledged. 
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5 Towards a non-representational democracy 
“... while networks in many ways are regulated indirectly by the  
sovereign interests of the state, they are also not reducible to institutional 
apparatuses of the state. And this is what makes possible the creation of new 
institutional forms as expressions of non-representational democracy.” 
(Rossiter, 2006, p.39)  
The problems associated with governance outlined in this article reflect broader  
political structures and the ways in which the world market is constituted differently and 
the extent to which governmentality itself has evolved and been absorbed by other 
institutional bodies. The globalisation of capitalist production has given rise to a new 
form of sovereignty that is no longer based on the model of the nation-state and its 
representational structures of government (Hardt and Negri, 2000). The claim is that the 
‘new paradigm is both system and hierarchy’ and demonstrates the structural logic of 
‘governance without government’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000, pp.13–14). In this way, the 
direct role of government and the dominant thinking associated with it can be seen to be 
entirely problematic. In Organized Networks (2006), Rossiter asserts that there is an 
urgent need for new institutional forms that reflect ‘relational’ processes that challenge 
existing systems of governance and representational structures. The argument arises  
from the apparent inadequacy of modern institutions to respond to the impact of  
socio-technical networks. Emergent forms are radically dissimilar to the ways in which 
social relations are organised under what Rossiter refers to as the ‘moribund technics’ of 
modern institutions. These older forms, characterised as ‘networked organisations’, are 
hierarchical and centralising despite the rhetoric of apparent democracy and devolution. 
In contrast, emergent ‘organised networks’ are horizontal, collaborative and distributed in 
character offering a distinct social dynamic and transformational potential. The difference 
characterisations are illustrated in how institutions have responded to the central 
importance of intellectual property rights: on the one hand, networked organisations 
using this as a regulatory mechanism to enforce or extend existing power structures, and 
on the other, organised networks advocating open source culture (Rossiter, 2006) – or 
more precisely advocating ‘peer property’ as a consequence of production associated 
with free and open source principles. 
The argument is that new social processes arise directly from network cultures  
that challenge some of the existing paradigms of representational democracy. Emergent 
democratic activity is somewhat demonstrated in the socio-technical dynamics of  
mailing lists, blogs, wikis, content management systems, and so on. For instance, peer to 
peer networks allow for a distinct form of production – ‘peer production’ – relatively 
outside of the market and state influence (Benkler, 2006). Similarly, ‘peer governance’  
is non-hierarchical and represents an alternative to forms of governance, one based on 
civil society rather than on representational democracy. It is the institutional nature of 
this, as a description of the organisation of social relations, that makes it a thoroughly 
political issue (Rossiter, 2006). Organised networks represent relative institutional 
autonomy but not in isolation – they also need to operate tactically, engaging horizontal 
and vertical modes of interaction in recognition of their socio-technical architectures 
(Rossiter, 2006, p.36). Only in this way is politics invoked. 
Networks are clearly not limitless or without borders, but (like the free market)  
the situation is far more complex. Far from arguing against the role of institutions, the 
limits of democracy and governance can be seen to be a means to rethink politics  
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within network cultures and offer opportunities to develop strategies and techniques  
of better organisation without government intervention. This is what we refer to as  
‘non-representational democracy’ to describe democratic processes decoupled from 
govermentality constrained by market and state interests. The suggestion is that emerging 
forms from within network culture challenge the foundations of internet governance and 
offer alternative possibilities.  
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